International Journal of Environmental Science and Development

Abstract—In this paper, by combining a two-person nonzero-sum game, a multi-objective genetic algorithm and a cooperative game, we present a new game theoretic methodology for trading pollution discharge permits in rivers. A trade-off curve between the average treatment level of dischargers and fuzzy risk of low water quality is gained using the optimization model. Then, by using the two-person nonzero-sum game, the best non-dominated solution is chosen from the trade-off curve. The treatment costs of dischargers corresponding to the selected solution are reallocated among dischargers participating in a coalition and side payments are calculated. The proposed model is applied to the Zarjub River in Iran to illustrate its efficiency and applicability.

Index Terms—Trading Pollutant Discharge Permits, Fuzzy Bi-matrix Game, Water Quality.

M. R. Nikoo is a Ph.D Candidate at the School of Civil Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran (e-mail: nikoo@ut.ac.ir).
R. Kerachian is an Associate Professor at the School of Civil Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. He is also a member of Center of Excellence for Engineering and Management of Civil Infrastructures, College of Engineering, University of Tehran (phone: +98-21-61112176; fax: +98-21-66403808; e-mail: kerachian@ut.ac.ir).
M. H. Niksokhan is a Research Staff at the Water Research Institute, Tehran, Iran (e-mail: niksokhan@ut.ac.ir).
P. H. B. Beiglou is a M. Sc. Student at the School of Civil Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran (e-mail: hatami.pouyan@ut.ac.ir).

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Cite:Mohammad Reza Nikoo, Reza Kerachian, Mohammad Hossein Niksokhan and Pouyan Hatami Bahman Beiglou, "A Game Theoretic Model for Trading Pollution Discharge Permits in River Systems," International Journal of Environmental Science and Development vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 162-166, 2011.