International Journal of Environmental Science and Development

Abstract—The shale gas industry is growing very fast in China. Its potential environmental risks cause disputes among different stake holders. This paper used a game theory to study the choice behaviors and their impact factors of environmental regulators and production companies. The proposed model was applied to a shale gas project in Chongqing, China for demonstrating a case study in fast developing regions. It turns out that the pressure of environmental regulators is high; local residents may have the tendency to neglect the environmental risk because of economic benefits. We propose the environmental management pays more attention on heavy regulations to over-standard discharge companies and strengthen public participation by opening up more ways to participate.

Index Terms—Environmental regulators, game theory, production company, shale gas.

L. Liu is with State Key Laboratory of Coal Mine Disaster Dynamic and Control, and School of Resource and Environmental Science, Chongqing University, Chongqing, CO 400044, China (e-mail: zhliuli@cqu.edu.cn).
X. B. Jiang and S. Zhou are with School of Resource and Environmental Science, Chongqing University, Chongqing, CO 400044, China (e-mail:20152013060@cqu.edu.cn, 676062196@qq.com).
X. Y. Lu was with Chongqing University, China, CO 400044 China. She is now with Tech and Ecology Construction Co. Ltd., Shenzhen, CO 518000, China (e-mail: 378151944@qq. com).

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Cite: L. Liu, X. B. Jiang, X. Y. Lu, and S. Zhou, "A Game Theory Approach to Address Profit Conflicts in Environmental Regulation of Shale Gas Development in Chongqing of China," International Journal of Environmental Science and Development vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 331-335, 2018.